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Abstract
Contextual bandit algorithms are applied in a
wide range of domains, from advertising to recom-
mender systems, from clinical trials to education.
In many of these domains, malicious agents may
have incentives to attack the bandit algorithm to
induce it to perform a desired behavior. For in-
stance, an unscrupulous ad publisher may try to
increase their own revenue at the expense of the
advertisers; a seller may want to increase the ex-
posure of their products, or thwart a competitor’s
advertising campaign. In this paper, we study sev-
eral attack scenarios and show that a malicious
agent can force a linear contextual bandit algo-
rithm to pull any desired arm T − o(T ) times
over a horizon of T steps, while applying adver-
sarial modifications to either rewards or contexts
that only grow logarithmically as O(log T ). We
also investigate the case when a malicious agent
is interested in affecting the behavior of the ban-
dit algorithm in a single context (e.g., a specific
user). We first provide sufficient conditions for
the feasibility of the attack and we then propose
an efficient algorithm to perform the attack. We
validate our theoretical results on experiments per-
formed on both synthetic and real-world datasets.
1. Introduction
Recommender systems are at the heart of the business
model of many industries like e-commerce or video stream-
ing (Davidson et al., 2010; Gomez-Uribe & Hunt, 2015).
The two most common approaches for this task are based
either on matrix factorization (Park et al., 2017) or bandit
algorithms (Li et al., 2010), which both rely on a unaltered
feedback loop between the recommender system and the
user. In recent years, a fair amount of work has been ded-
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icated to understanding how targeted perturbations in the
feedback loop can fool a recommender system into recom-
mending low quality items.
Following the line of research on adversarial attacks in deep
learning (Goodfellow et al., 2014) and supervised learning
(Biggio et al., 2012; Jagielski et al., 2018; Li et al., 2016; Liu
et al., 2017), attacks on recommender systems have been
focused on filtering-based algorithms (Christakopoulou &
Banerjee, 2019; Mehta & Nejdl, 2008) and offline contex-
tual bandits (Ma et al., 2018). The question of adversarial
attacks for online bandit algorithms has only started being
studied quite recently (Jun et al., 2018; Liu & Shroff, 2019;
Immorlica et al., 2018), though solely in the multi-armed
stochastic setting. Although the idea of online adversar-
ial bandit algorithms is not new (see EXP3 algorithm in
(Auer et al., 2002)), the focus is different from what we are
considering here. Indeed, algorithms like EXP3 or EXP4
(Lattimore & Szepesva´ri, 2018) are designed to find the op-
timal actions in hindsight to adapt to any stream of rewards
without any further assumptions.
The opposition between the adversarial bandit setting and
the stochastic setting has sparked interests in studying a
middle ground. In (Bubeck & Slivkins, 2012), the learn-
ing algorithm has no knowledge of the type of feedback it
receives. In (Li et al., 2019; Gupta et al., 2019; Lykouris
et al., 2019; Kapoor et al., 2019), the rewards are assumed
to be stochastic but can be perturbed by some attacks and
the authors focus on constructing algorithms able to find the
optimal actions even in the presence of some non-random
perturbations. However, those perturbations are bounded
and agnostic to the choices of the learning algorithm. There
are also some efforts in the broader Deep Reinforcement
Learning (DRL) literature, focusing on modifying the obser-
vations of different states to fool a DRL system at inference
time (Hussenot et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2020).
Contribution. In this work, we first follow the research
direction opened by (Jun et al., 2018) where the attacker has
the objective of fooling a learning algorithm into taking a
specific action as much as possible. Consider a news recom-
mendation problem as described in (Li et al., 2010), a bandit
algorithm has to choose between K articles to recommend
to a user, based on some information about them, termed
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context. We assume that an attacker sits between the user
and the website and can choose the reward (i.e., click or not)
for the recommended article. Their goal is to fool the bandit
algorithm into recommending a particular target article to
most users. We extend the work in (Jun et al., 2018; Liu &
Shroff, 2019) to the contextual linear bandit setting showing
how to perturb rewards for both stochastic and adversarial
algorithms. For the first time, we consider and analyze the
setting in which the attacker can only modify the context x
associated with the current user (the reward is not altered).
The goal of the attacker is still to fool the bandit algorithm
into pulling the target arm for most users while minimizing
the total norm of their attacks. We show that it is possible to
fool the widely known LINUCB algorithm (Abbasi-Yadkori
et al., 2011; Lattimore & Szepesva´ri, 2018) with this new
type of attack on the context. Finally, we present a harder
setting for the attacker, where the latter can only modify
the context associated to a specific user. For example, this
situation may occur when a malicious agent has infected
some computers with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The
attacker can thus modify the history of navigation of a spe-
cific user and, as a consequence, the information seen by the
online recommender system. We show how the attacker can
attack the two very common bandit algorithms LINUCB
and LINTS (Agrawal & Goyal, 2013) and, in certain cases,
have them pull a target arm most of the time when a specific
user visits a website.
2. Preliminaries
We consider the standard contextual linear bandit setting
with K ∈ N arms. At each time t, the agent observes a con-
text xt ∈ Rd, selects an action at ∈ J1,KK and observes
a reward: rt,at = 〈θat , xt〉 + ηtat where for each arm a,
θa ∈ Rd is a feature vector and ηtat is a conditionally inde-
pendent zero-mean, σ2-subgaussian noise. We also make
the following assumptions on the contexts and parameter
vectors.
Assumption 1. There exist L > 0 and D ⊂ Rd, such that
for all t, xt ∈ D and:
∀x ∈ D,∀a ∈ J1,KK, ||x||2 ≤ L and 〈θa, x〉 ∈ (0, 1]
In addition, we assume that there exists S > 0 such that
||θa||2 ≤ S for all arms a.
The agent is interested in minimizing the cumulative regret,
RT after T steps:
RT =
T∑
t=1
〈θa?t , xt〉 − 〈θat , xt〉
where a?t := argmaxa〈θa, xt〉. A bandit learning algorithm
A is said to be no-regret when it satisfies RT = o(T ), i.e.,
the average expected reward received by A converges to the
optimal one.
Classical bandit algorithms (e.g., LINUCB (Alg. 3) and
LINTS (Alg. 4)) compute an estimate of the unknown pa-
rameters θa using past observations. Formally, for each
arm a ∈ [K] we define Sta as the set of times up to t − 1
(included) where the agent played arm a. Then, the esti-
mated parameters are obtained through regularized least-
squares regression as θ̂ta = (Xt,aX
>
t,a + λI)
−1Xt,aYt,a,
where λ > 0, Xt,a = (xi)i∈Sta ∈ Rd×|S
t
a| and Yt,a =
(ri,ai)i∈Sta ∈ R|S
t
a|. Denote by Vt,a = λI + Xt,aX>t,a the
design matrix of the regularized least-square problem and
by ‖x‖V =
√
x>V x the weighted norm w.r.t. any positive
matrix V ∈ Rd×d. We define the confidence set
Ct,a =
{
θ ∈ Rd :
∥∥∥θ − θ̂t,a∥∥∥
Vt,a
≤ βt,a
}
(1)
where βt,a = σ
√
d log
(
1+L2(1+|Sta|)/λ
δ
)
+ S
√
λ, which
guarantees that θa ∈ Ct,a, for all t > 0, w.p. 1 −
δ. This uncertainty is used to balance the exploration-
exploitation trade-off either through optimism (e.g., LIN-
UCB) or through randomization (e.g., LINTS).
3. Online Adversarial Attacks on Rewards
The ultimate goal of a malicious agent is to force the ban-
dit algorithm to perform a desired behavior. An attacker
may simply want to induce the bandit algorithm to per-
form poorly—ruining the users’ experience—or to force
the algorithm to suggest a specific arm. The latter case is
particularly interesting in advertising where a seller may
want to increase the exposure of its product at the expense
of the competitors. Note that the users’ experience is also
compromised by the latter attack since the suggestions they
will receive will not be tailored to their needs. Similarly
to (Liu & Shroff, 2019; Jun et al., 2018), we focus on the
latter objective, i.e., to fool the bandit algorithm into pulling
a target arm a† for T − o(T ) time steps (independently of
the user). A way to obtain this behavior is to dynamically
modify the reward in order to make the bandit algorithm
believe that a† is optimal. Clearly, the attacker has to pay a
price in order to modify the perceived bandit problem and
fool the algorithm. If there is no restriction on when and
how the attacker can alter the reward, the attacker can easily
fool the algorithm. However, this setting is not interesting
since the attacker may pay a cost higher than the loss suf-
fered by the attacked algorithm. An attack strategy is thus
considered successful when the total cost of the attack is
sublinear in T .
Setting. We assume that the attacker has the same knowl-
edge as the bandit algorithm A about the problem (i.e.,
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Algorithm 1 Contextual ACE
for t = 1, ..., T do
Alg. A chooses arm at based on context xt
Environment generates reward: rt,at = 〈θat , xt〉+ ηt
with ηtat conditionally σ
2-subgaussian
Attacker observes reward rt,at and feeds the perturbed
reward r˜1t,at (or r˜
2
t,at ) to A
end for
knows σ and L). The attacker is assumed to be able to
observe the context xt and the arm at pulled by A, and
can modify the reward received by A. When the attacker
modifies the reward rt,at into r˜t,at the instantaneous cost
of the attack is defined as ct :=
∣∣rt,at − r˜t,at∣∣. The goal of
the attacker is to fool algorithm A such that arm a† is pulled
T − o(T ) times and∑Tt=1 ct = o(T ).
Attack idea. We leverage the idea presented in (Liu &
Shroff, 2019) and (Jun et al., 2018) where the attacker lowers
the reward of arms a 6= a† so that algorithm A learns that
the target arm is optimal for every context. Since A is
assumed to be no-regret, the attacker only needs to modify
the rewards o(T ) times to achieve this goal.
Lowering the rewards has the effect of shifting the vectors
(θa)a6=a† to new vectors (θ′a)a6=a† such that for all arms
a 6= a† and all contexts x ∈ D, 〈θ′a, x〉 ≤ 〈θa† , x〉.
Since rewards are assumed to be bounded (see Asm. 1), this
objective can be achieved by simply forcing the reward of
non-target arms a 6= a† to the minimum value. Contextual
ACE (see Alg. 2) implements a soft version of this idea by
leveraging the knowledge of the reward distribution. At each
round t, Contextual ACE modifies the reward perceived by
A as follows:
r˜1t,at =
{
η′t if at 6= a†
rt,a† otherwise
(2)
where η′t is a σ-subgaussian random variable generated by
the attacker independently of all other random variables. By
doing this, Contextual ACE transforms the original problem
into a stationary bandit problem in which a† is optimal
for all the contexts (having mean 〈x, θ†〉) and all the other
arms have expected reward of 0. Despite this attack may
seem expensive, the following proposition shows that the
cumulative cost of the attacks is sublinear.
Proposition 1. For any δ ∈ (0, 1/K], when using Contex-
tual ACE algorithm (Alg 1) with perturbed rewards r˜1, with
probability at least 1−Kδ, algorithm A pulls arm a† for
T − o(T ) time steps and the total cost of attacks is o(T ).
The proof of this proposition is provided in App. A.1. While
Prop. 1 holds for any no-regret algorithm A, we can provide
a more precise bound on the total cost by inspecting the
algorithm. For example, we can show (see App. D), that,
with probability at least 1−Kδ, the number of times LIN-
UCB (Abbasi-Yadkori et al., 2011) pulls arms different than
a† is at most:
∑
j 6=a†
Nj(T ) ≤ 64Kσ
2λS2
minx∈D〈θa† , x〉2
(
d log
(
λ+ TL
2
d
δ2
))2
This directly translates into a bound on the total cost.
Comparison with ACE In the stochastic setting, the
ACE algorithm (Liu & Shroff, 2019) leverages a bound
on the expected reward of each arm in order to modify
the reward. However, the perturbed reward process seen
by algorithm A is non-stationary and in general there is
no guarantee that an algorithm minimizing the regret in a
stationary bandit problem keeps the same performance when
the bandit problem is not stationary anymore. Nonetheless,
transposing the idea of the ACE algorithm to our setting
would give an attack of the following form, where at time t,
Alg. A pulls arm at and receives rewards r˜2t,at :
r˜2t,at =
{
rt,at + max(−1,min(0, Ct,at)) if at 6= a†
rt,a† otherwise
with Ct,at = (1 − γ) minθ∈Ct,a† 〈θ, xt〉 −
maxθ∈Ct,at 〈θ, xt〉. Note that Ct,a is defined as in Eq. 1
using the non-perturbed rewards, i.e., Yt,a = (ri,ai)i∈Sta .
Constrained Attack. When the attacker has a constraint
on the instantaneous cost of the attack, using the perturbed
reward r˜1 may not be possible as the cost of the attack at
time t is not decreasing over time. Using the perturbed
reward r˜2 offers a more flexible type of attack with more
control on the instantaneous cost thanks to the parameter γ.
However, even this attack does not work when the maximum
cost of an attack is too small.
Defense mechanism. The attack based on reward r˜1 is
hardly detectable without prior knownledge about the prob-
lem. In fact, the reward process associated to r˜1 is stationary
and compatible with the assumption about the true reward
(e.g., subgaussian). While having very low rewards is rea-
sonable in advertising, in other problems makes the attack
easily detectable. On the other hand, the fact that r˜2 is a non-
stationary process makes this attack easy to detect. When
some data are already available on each arm, the learner
can monitor the difference between the average rewards per
action computed on new and old data.
Remark 1. It is possible to extend this attack to multiple
target arms a† ∈ A†. Similarly to (2), we can set r˜1t,at = η′t
when at /∈ A†.
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4. Online Adversarial Attacks on Contexts
In this section, we consider the attacker to be able to alter the
context xt perceived by the algorithm rather than the reward
that is to say the attacker is now restricted to change the
type of users presented to the learning algorithm A, hence
changing their perception of the environment.
Setting. As in Sec. 3, we consider the attacker to have
the same knowledge about the problem as A. The main
difference with the previous setting is that the attacker acts
before the algorithm. It means that the attacker does not
know the arm that would have been chosen by A when
presented with the true context xt. Therefore, we need to
have knowledge about the way the algorithm A behaves. We
focus on LINUCB and we assume the attacker knows the
parameters of the algorithm. This is known as a white-box
setting in the adversarial attacks literature (Goodfellow et al.,
2014). The goal of the attacker is unchanged: they aim at
forcing the algorithm to pull the target arm a† for T − o(T )
time steps while paying a sublinear total cost. We denote
by x˜t the context after the attack and by ct = ||xt − x˜t||2
the instantaneous cost. Finally, we assume that the attacker
knows a positive lower bound of the expected reward as
follows.
Assumption 2. For all x ∈ D, 0 < ν ≤ 〈x, θa†〉.
Attack Idea: The idea behind the attack in this setting is
similar to the idea behind the attack in Sec 3: the attacker
builds a bandit problem where arm a† is optimal for all
contexts by lowering the perceived value of all other arms.
Here, the attacker cannot modify the reward, but they can
scale the contexts in order to decrease the predicted rewards
in the original context. At time t, the attacker receives the
context xt and computes the attack as follows:
1. Thanks to the white-box setting, the attacker computes
the arm at that alg. A would pull if presented with
context xt.
2. If at 6= a† then the attacker changes the context to
x˜t = αatxt with αat > maxx∈D〈θat , x〉/〈θa† , x〉. In
practice, for every arm a we set αa = α = 2/ν.
In other words, the attacker performs a dilatation of the
incoming context every time alg. A does not pull arm a†.
The fact that the decision rule used by LINUCB is invariant
by dilatation guarantees that the attacker will not inadver-
tently lower the perceived rewards for arm a†. Because the
rewards are assumed to be linear, presenting a large context
αx and receiving the reward associated with the normal
context x will skew the estimated rewards of LINUCB. The
attack protocol is summarized in Alg. 2.
Proposition 2. Using the attack described in Alg. 2, for any
δ ∈ (0, 1/K], with probability at least 1−Kδ, the number
Algorithm 2 Contextual Conic Attack
Input: attack parameter: α
for t = 1, ..., T do
Attacker observes the context xt, computes potential
arm a′t and sets x˜t = xt + (α− 1)xt 1{a′t 6=a†}
Alg. A chooses arm at based on context x˜t
Environment generates reward: rt,at = 〈θat , xt〉+ ηt
with ηt conditionally σ2-subgaussian
Alg. A observes reward rt,at
end for
of times LINUCB does not pull arm a† before time T is at
most:
∑
j 6=a†
Nj(T ) ≤ 32K2
(
λ
α2
+ σ2d log
(
λd+ TL2α2
dλδ
))3
with Nj(T ) the number of times arm j has been pulled
during the first T steps, The total cost for the attacker is
bounded by:
T∑
t=1
ct ≤ 64K
2
ν
(
λ
α2
+ σ2d log
(
λd+ TL2α2
dλδ
))3
The proof of Proposition 2 (see App. A.2) assumes that the
attacker can attack at any time step, and that they can know
in advance which arm will be pulled by Alg. A in a given
context. Thus it is not applicable to random exploration
algorithms like LINTS (Agrawal & Goyal, 2013) and ε-
GREEDY. We also observed empirically that randomized
algorithms are more robust to attacks (see Sec. 7).
Remark 2. If the attacker wants alg. A to pull any arm
in a set of target arms A†, the same type of attack can still
be used with ν such that 0 < ν ≤ maxa∈A†〈x, θa〉 for all
x ∈ D. Then, the context is multiplied by α = 2/ν when
alg. A is going to pull an arm not in A†.
5. Attacks on a Single Context
Previous sections focused on the man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attack either on reward or context. The MITM
attack allows the attacker to arbitrarily change the informa-
tion observed by the recommender system at each round.
This attack may be difficulty feasible in practice, since the
exchange channels are generally protected by authentication
and cryptographic systems. In this section, we consider the
scenario where the attacker has control over a single user u.
As an example, consider the case where the device of the
user is infected by a malware (e.g., Trojan horse), giving full
control of the system to the malicious agent. The attacker
can thus modify the context of the specific user (e.g., by
altering the cookies) that is perceived by the recommender
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system. We believe that changes to the context (e.g., cook-
ies) are more subtle and less easily detectable than changes
to the reward (e.g., click). Moreover, if the reward is a pur-
chase, it cannot be altered easily by taking control of the
user’s device.
Clearly, the impact of the attacker on the overall perfor-
mance of the recommender system depends on the frequency
of the specific user, that is out of the attacker’s control. It
may be thus impossible to obtain guarantees on the cumula-
tive regret of algorithm A. For this reason, we mainly focus
on the study of the feasibility of the attack.
Formally, the attacker targets a specific user (i.e., the in-
fected user) associated to a context x†. Similarly to Sec. 4,
the objective of the attacker is to find the minimal change
to the context presented to the recommender system A such
that the target arm a† is selected by A. A observes a mod-
ified context x˜ instead of x†. After selecting an arm at, A
observes the true noisy reward rt,at = 〈θat , x†〉+ ηtat . As
before, we study the white-box setting where the attacker
has access to all the parameters of A.
5.1. Optimistic Algorithms
LINUCB chooses the arm to pull by maximizing an
upper-confidence bound on the expected reward. For
each arm a and context x, the UCB value is given by
maxθ∈Ct,a〈x, θ〉 = 〈x, θˆta〉+ βt,a‖x‖V˜ −1t,a (see Sec. 2).
The objective of the attacker is to force LINUCB to pull
arm a† once presented with context x†. This means to find a
perturbation of context x† that makes a† the most optimistic
arm. Clearly, we would like to keep the perturbation as
small as possible to reduce the cost for the attacker and the
probability of being detected. Formally, the attacker needs
to solve the following non-convex optimization problem:
min
y∈Rd
‖y‖2
s.t max
θ∈C˜t,a
〈x† + y, θ〉+ ξ ≤ max
θ∈C˜
t,a†
〈x† + y, θ〉 (3)
where ξ > 0 is a parameter of the attacker and C˜t,a :=
{
θ |
‖θ − θˆta‖V˜t,a ≤ βt,a
}
is the confidence set constructed by
LINUCB. We use the notation C˜, V˜ to stress the fact that
LINUCB observes only the modified context.
In contrast to Sec. 3 and 4, the attacker may not be able
to force the algorithm to pull the desired arm a†. In other
words, Problem 3 may not be feasible. However, we are
able to characterize the feasibility of (3).
Theorem 1. For any ξ > 0, Problem (3) is feasible at time
θˆ1
θˆ2
θˆ4
θˆ3
θ1
θ2
θ3 θ4
θ5
θˆ5
Figure 1. Illustrative example of condition (4). The target arm is
arm 3 or 5 and the dashed black line is the convex hull of the other
confidence sets. The ellipsoids are the confidence sets Ct,a for
each arm a. If we consider only arms {1, 2, 4, 5}, and we use 5 as
the target arm, the condition (4) is satisfied as there is a θ outside
the convex hull of the other confidence sets. On the other hand, if
we consider arms {1, 2, 3, 4} and we use 3 as the target arm, the
condition is not satisfied anymore.
t if and only if:
∃θ ∈ C˜t,a† , θ 6∈ Conv
 ⋃
a 6=a†
C˜t,a
 (4)
In other words, the condition given by Theorem 1 says that
the attack described here can be done when there exists
a vector x for which the arm a† is assumed to be optimal
according to LINUCB. The condition mainly stems from the
fact that optimizing a linear product on a convex compact
set will reach its maximum on the edge of this set. In our
case this set is the convex hull described by the confidence
ellipsoids of LINUCB.
Although it is possible to use an optimization algorithm
for this particular class of non-convex problems—e.g., DC
programming (Tuy, 1995)—they are still slow compared to
convex algorithms. Therefore, we present a simple convex
relaxation of the previous problem that is simple and still
enjoys some empirical performance improvement compared
to Problem (3). The relaxed problem is the following:
min
y∈Rd
‖y‖2
s.t max
a6=a†
max
θ∈Ct,a
〈x† + y, θ − θˆta†〉 ≤ −ξ
(5)
Since the RHS of the constraint in Problem (3) can be writ-
ten as maxθ∈C
t,a† 〈θ, x† + y〉 for any y, the relaxation here
consists in using 〈θ, x† + y〉 as a lower-bound to this maxi-
mum for any θ ∈ Ct,a† .
For the relaxed Problem (5), the same type of reasoning as
for Problem (3) gives that Problem (5) is feasible if and only
if:
θˆa†(t) 6∈ Conv
 ⋃
a 6=a†
Ct,a

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Remark 3. When a set of target arms is available, the
feasibility condition is the same except that the attacker now
cares about the union of the confidence ellipsoids for each
arm in the set of target arms.
When condition (4) is not met, the arm a† cannot be pulled
by LINUCB. Indeed, the proof of Theorem 1 shows that
the upper-confidence of the arm a† is always dominated
by another arm for any context. Let us assume that a† is
optimal for some contexts. More formally, there exists a
sub-space V ⊂ D such that:
∀x ∈ V, 〈x, θa†〉 > 〈x, θa〉
We also assume that the distribution of the contexts is such
that, for all t, µ := P (xt ∈ V ) > 0. Then, the regret is
lower-bounded in expectation by:
E(RT ) = E
(
T∑
t=1
1{xt∈V }
( 〈xt, θa† − θat〉 )
)
≥ µm(T ) min
x∈V
max
a6=a†
〈θa† − θa, x〉
where m(T ) is the expected number of times t ≤ T
such that condition (4) is not met. LINUCB guarantees
that E(RT ) ≤ O(
√
T ) for every T . Hence, m(T ) ≤
O
( √
T
µminx∈V maxa6=a† 〈θa†−θa,x〉
)
. This means that, in an
unattacked problem, condition (4) is met T −O(√T ) times.
On the other hand, when the algorithm is attacked the regret
of LINUCB is not sub-linear as the confidence bound for the
target arm is not valid anymore. Hence we cannot provide
the same type of guarantees for the attacked problem.
5.2. Random Exploration algorithms
The previous subsection focused on LINUCB, however we
can obtain similar guarantees for algorithms with random
exploration such as LINTS. In this case, it is not possible
to guarantee that a specific arm will be pulled for a given
context because of the randomness in the arm selection
process. The objective is to guarantee that arm a† is pulled
with probability at least 1− δ.
Similarly to the previous subsection, the problem of the
attacker can be written as:
min
y∈Rd
‖y‖
s.t P
(
∀a 6= a†, 〈x† + y, θ˜a − θ˜a†〉 ≤ −ξ
)
≥ 1− δ
(6)
where the θ˜a for different arms a are independently drawn
from a normal distribution with mean θˆa(t) and covari-
ance matrix υ2V¯ −1a (t) with υ = σ
√
9d ln(T/δ). Solv-
ing this problem is not easy and in general not possible.
For a given x and arm a, the random variable 〈x, θ˜a〉
is normally distributed with mean µa(x) := 〈θˆa(t), x〉
and variance σ2a(x) := ν
2||x||2
V¯ −1a (t)
. We can then write
〈x, θ˜a〉 = µa(x) + σa(x)Za with (Za)a ∼ N (0, IK). For
the sake of clarity, we drop the variable x when writing
µa(x) and σa(x). Thus the constraint in Problem (6) be-
comes:
EZ
a†
(
Πa6=a†Φ
(
σa†Za† + µa† − µa
σa
))
≥ 1− δ
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a nor-
mally distributed Gaussian random variable. Unfortunately,
computing exactly the expectation of the last line is an open
problem. Following the idea of (Liu & Shroff, 2019), a
possible relaxation of the constraint in Problem (6) is, for
every arm a:
1− Φ
µa† − µa − ξ√
σ2a + σ
2
a†
 ≤ δ
K − 1
Therefore, the relaxed version of the attack on LINTS is:
min
y∈Rd
||y||
s.t ∀a 6= a† 〈x† + y, θˆa†(t)− θˆa(t)〉 − ξ
≥ νΦ−1 (1− δ/(K − 1)) ∣∣∣∣x† + y∣∣∣∣
V¯ −1a (t)+V¯
−1
a† (t)
(7)
Problem (7) is similar to Problem (5) as the constraint is also
a Second Order Cone program but with different parameters
(see App. C).
6. Attacks on Adversarial Bandits
In the previous sections, we studied algorithms with sublin-
ear regret RT , i.e., mainly bandit algorithms designed for
stochastic stationary environments. Adversarial algorithms
like EXP4 do not provably enjoy a sublinear regret RT . In
addition, because this type of algorithms are, by design, ro-
bust to non-stationary environments, one could expect them
to induce a linear cost on the attacker. In this section, we
show that this is not the case for most contextual adversarial
algorithms. Contextual adversarial algorithms are studied
through the reduction to the bandit with expert advice prob-
lem. This is a bandit problem with K arms where at every
step, N experts suggest a probability distribution over the
arms. The goal of the algorithm is to learn which expert
gets the best expected reward in hindsight after T steps. The
regret in this type of problem is defined as:
RexpT = E
 max
m∈J1,NK
T∑
t=1
K∑
j=1
E
(t)
m,jrt,j − rt,at

where E(t)m,j is the probability of selecting arm j for expert
m. In the case of contextual adversarial bandits, the experts
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first observe the context xt before recommending an expert
m. Assuming the current setting with linear rewards, we can
show that if an algorithm A, like EXP4, enjoys a sublinear
regret RexpT , then, using the Contextual ACE attack with
either r˜1 or r˜2, the attacker can fool the algorithm into
pulling arm a† a linear number of times under some mild
assumptions. However, attacking contexts for this type of
algorithm is difficult because, even though the rewards are
linear, the experts are not assumed to use a specific model
for selecting an action.
Proposition 3. Suppose an adversarial algorithm A sat-
isfies a regret RexpT of order o(T ) for any bandit prob-
lem and that there exists an expert m? such that T −∑T
t=1 E
(
E
(t)
m?,a?
)
= o(T ). Then attacking alg. A with
Contextual ACE leads to pulling arm a†, T − o(T ) of times
in expectation with a total cost of o(T ) for the attacker.
The proof is similar to the one of Prop. 1 and is presented in
App. A.4. The condition on the expert in Prop. 3 means that
there exists an expert which believes a† is optimal most of
the time. The adversarial algorithm will then learn that this
expert is optimal.
Algorithm EXP4 has a regret RexpT bounded by√
2TK log(N), thus the total number of pulls of
arms different from a† is bounded by
√
2TK log(M)/γ.
This result also implies that for adversarial algorithms like
EXP3 (Auer et al., 2002), the same type of attacks could
be used to fool A into pulling arm a† because the MAB
problem can be seen as a reduction of the contextual bandit
problem with a unique context and one expert for each arm.
7. Experiments
In this section, we conduct experiments on the attacks on
contextual bandit problems with simulated data and two real-
word datasets: MovieLens25M (Harper & Konstan, 2015)
and Jester (Goldberg et al., 2001). The synthetic dataset and
the data preprocessing step are presented in Appendix B.1.
7.1. Attacks on Rewards
We study the impact of the reward attack for 4 contextual
algorithms: LINUCB, LINTS, ε-GREEDY and EXP4. As
parameters, we use L=1 for the maximal norm of the con-
texts, δ = 0.01, υ = σ
√
d ln(t/δ))/2, εt = 1/
√
t at each
time step t and λ = 0.1. For EXP4, we use N = 10 experts
with N − 2 experts returning a random action at each time,
one expert choosing action a† every time and one expert
returning the optimal arm for every context. With this set
of experts the regret of bandits with expert advice is the
same as in the contextual case. To test the performance of
each algorithm, we generate 40 random contextual bandit
problems and run each algorithm for T = 106 steps on each.
We report the average cost and regret for each of the 40
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Figure 2. Total cost of the attacks on the rewards on the synthetic
and dataset-based environments with γ = 0.5 for Jester and Movie-
Lens and γ = 0.22 for the synthetic dataset.
problems.
Figure 2 shows the attacked algorithms using the attacked
reward r˜1 (reported as stationary CACE) and the rewards
r˜2 (reported as CACE). These experiments show that, even
though the reward process is non-stationary, usual stochas-
tic algorithms like LINUCB can still adapt to it and pull
the optimal arm for this reward process (which is arm a†).
The true regret of the attacked algorithms is linear as a† is
not optimal for all contexts. In the synthetic case, for the
algorithms attacked with the rewards r˜2, over 1M iterations
and γ = 0.22, the target arm is drawn more than 99.4%
of the time on average for every algorithm and more than
97.8% of the time for the stationary attack r˜1 (see Table 3 in
App. B.2). The dataset-based environments (see Figure 2)
exhibit the same behavior: the target arm is pulled more
94.0% of the time on average for all our attacks on Jester
and MovieLens and more than 77.0% of the time in the
worst case (for LINTS attacked with the stationary rewards)
(see Table 3).
7.2. Attacks on Contexts
We now illustrate the setting of Sec. 4. We test the perfor-
mance of LINUCB, LINTS and ε-GREEDY with the same
parameters as in the previous experiments. Yet since the
variance is much smaller in this case, we generate a ran-
dom problem and run 20 simulations for each algorithm and
each attack type. The target arm is chosen to minimize the
average expected reward over all contexts and we use the
exact lower-bound on the reward for this target arm as ν. In
addition, we also test the performance of an attack where
the contexts are multiplied by 5 compared to the attack in
Sec. 4 but where the attacker is only allowed to attack 20%
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Synthetic Jester Movilens
LINUCB 2.38% 1.47% 2.24%
CC LINUCB 99.99% 99.53% 99.74%
CC20 LINUCB 99.96% 99.24% 99.55%
ε-GREEDY 0.26% 0.58% 0.30%
CC ε-GREEDY 99.98% 99.83% 99.90%
CC20 ε-GREEDY 99.97% 99.30% 99.65%
LINTS 3.27% 1.27% 1.29%
CC LINTS 9.08% 7.24% 99.13%
CC20 LINTS 32.22% 43.78% 95.78%
Table 1. Percentage of iterations for which the algorithm pulled
the target arm a† for each type of attack, averaged on 20 runs of
1M iterations. In the CC version, the contexts are modified using
the ContextualConic attack (Sec. 4).
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Figure 3. Total cost of ContextualConic attacks on the synthetic
and dataset-based environments.
of the time. The rest of the time the attacker does not modify
the context. We call this attack as CC20. Table. 1 shows the
percentage of times the target arm a† has been selected by
the attacked algorithm. We see that, as expected, CC LIN-
UCB reaches a ratio of almost 1, meaning the target arms is
indeed selected a linear number of times. A more surprising
result (at least not covered by the theory) is that ε-GREEDY
exhibits the same behavior. Similarly to LINTS, ε-GREEDY
exhibits some randomness in the action selection process. It
can cause a† to be chosen when the context is attacked and
interfere with the principle of the attack. We suspect that is
what happens for LINTS. Fig. 3 shows the total cost of the
attacks for the attacked algorithms (except for LINTS, for
which the cost is linear). Although the theory only covers
the case when the attacker is able to attack at any time step,
the CC20 attack reaches almost the same success rate as CC
for LINUCB and ε-GREEDY.
Synthetic Jester MovieLens
LINUCB 0.07% 0.01% 0.39%
LINUCB Relaxed 13.76% 97.81% 4.09%
LINUCB Full 88.30% 99.98% 99.99%
ε-GREEDY 0.01% 0.00% 0.03%
ε-GREEDY Full 99.98% 99.95% 99.97%
LINTS 0.02% 0.01% 0.05%
LINTS Relaxed 18.21% 80.48% 5.56%
Table 2. Percentage of times an algorithm pulled the target arm
a† when context x? was drawn, averaged on 40 runs of 1M it-
erations. When applicable, the Relaxed version corresponds to
solving a relaxed convex version of the problem while the Full
attack corresponds to solving the exact optimization problem.
7.3. Attacks on a Single Context
We now move to the setting described in Sec. 5 and test the
same algorithms as in Sec. 7.2. We run 40 simulations for
each algorithm and each attack type. The target context x†
is chosen randomly and the target arm as the arm minimiz-
ing the expected reward for x†. The attacker is only able to
modify the incoming context for the target context (which
corresponds to the context of one user) and the incoming
contexts are sampled uniformly from the set of all possible
contexts (of size 100). Table 2 shows the percentage of
success for each attack. We observe that the non-relaxed
attacks on ε-GREEDY and LINUCB work well across all
datasets. However, the relaxed attack for LINUCB and
LINTS are not as successful, on the synthetic dataset and
MovieLens25M. The Jester dataset seems to be particularly
suited to this type of attacks because the true feature vectors
are well separated from the convex hull formed by the fea-
ture vectors of the other arms. Only 5% of Jester’s feature
vectors are contained in the convex hull of the others while
this number amounts to 8% for MovieLens and 20% on
average for the synthetic dataset.
As expected, the cost of the attacks is linear on all the
datasets (see Figure 6 in App. B.4). The cost is also lower
for the non-relaxed than for the relaxed version of the attack
on LINUCB. Unsurprisingly, the cost of the attacks on
LINTS is the highest due to the need to guarantee that the
arm a† will be chosen with high probability (95% in our
experiments).
8. Conclusion
We presented several settings for online attacks on contex-
tual bandits. We showed that an attacker can force any
contextual bandit algorithm to almost always pull an arbi-
trary target arm a† with only sublinear modifications of the
rewards. When the attacker can only modify the contexts,
we prove that LINUCB can still be attacked and made to
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almost always pull a† by adding sublinear perturbations to
the contexts. When the attacker can only attack a single
context, we derive a feasibility condition for the attacks and
we introduce a method to compute some attacks of small
instantaneous cost for LINUCB, ε-GREEDY and LINTS.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to de-
scribe effective attacks on the contexts of contextual bandit
algorithms. Our numerical experiments, conducted on both
synthetic and real-world data, validate our results and show
that the attacks on all contexts are actually effective on
several algorithms and with more permissible settings.
References
Abbasi-Yadkori, Y., Pa´l, D., and Szepesva´ri, C. Improved
algorithms for linear stochastic bandits. In Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems, pp. 2312–2320,
2011.
Agrawal, A., Verschueren, R., Diamond, S., and Boyd, S.
A rewriting system for convex optimization problems.
Journal of Control and Decision, 5(1):42–60, 2018.
Agrawal, S. and Goyal, N. Thompson sampling for contex-
tual bandits with linear payoffs. In International Confer-
ence on Machine Learning, pp. 127–135, 2013.
Auer, P., Cesa-Bianchi, N., and Fischer, P. Finite-time
analysis of the multiarmed bandit problem. Machine
learning, 47(2-3):235–256, 2002.
Biggio, B., Nelson, B., and Laskov, P. Poisoning at-
tacks against support vector machines. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1206.6389, 2012.
Bubeck, S. and Slivkins, A. The best of both worlds:
Stochastic and adversarial bandits. In Conference on
Learning Theory, pp. 42–1, 2012.
Christakopoulou, K. and Banerjee, A. Adversarial attacks
on an oblivious recommender. In Proceedings of the 13th
ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, RecSys 19,
pp. 322330, New York, NY, USA, 2019. Association for
Computing Machinery. ISBN 9781450362436. doi: 10.
1145/3298689.3347031. URL https://doi.org/
10.1145/3298689.3347031.
Davidson, J., Liebald, B., Liu, J., Nandy, P., Van Vleet, T.,
Gargi, U., Gupta, S., He, Y., Lambert, M., Livingston, B.,
et al. The youtube video recommendation system. In Pro-
ceedings of the fourth ACM conference on Recommender
systems, pp. 293–296, 2010.
Goldberg, K., Roeder, T., Gupta, D., and Perkins, C. Eigen-
taste: A constant time collaborative filtering algorithm.
information retrieval, 4(2):133–151, 2001.
Gomez-Uribe, C. A. and Hunt, N. The netflix recom-
mender system: Algorithms, business value, and inno-
vation. ACM Transactions on Management Information
Systems (TMIS), 6(4):1–19, 2015.
Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., and Szegedy, C. Explain-
ing and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
Gupta, A., Koren, T., and Talwar, K. Better algorithms for
stochastic bandits with adversarial corruptions. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1902.08647, 2019.
Harper, F. M. and Konstan, J. A. The movielens datasets:
History and context. Acm transactions on interactive
intelligent systems (tiis), 5(4):1–19, 2015.
Hussenot, L., Geist, M., and Pietquin, O. Targeted attacks on
deep reinforcement learning agents through adversarial
observations. arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.12282, 2019.
Immorlica, N., Sankararaman, K. A., Schapire, R. E., and
Slivkins, A. Adversarial bandits with knapsacks. 2019
IEEE 60th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Com-
puter Science (FOCS), pp. 202–219, 2018.
Jagielski, M., Oprea, A., Biggio, B., Liu, C., Nita-Rotaru,
C., and Li, B. Manipulating machine learning: Poisoning
attacks and countermeasures for regression learning. In
2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pp.
19–35. IEEE, 2018.
Jun, K.-S., Li, L., Ma, Y., and Zhu, J. Adversarial attacks
on stochastic bandits. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pp. 3640–3649, 2018.
Kapoor, S., Patel, K. K., and Kar, P. Corruption-tolerant ban-
dit learning. Machine Learning, 108(4):687–715, 2019.
Lattimore, T. and Szepesva´ri, C. Bandit algo-
rithms. Pre-publication version, 2018. URL
http://downloads.tor-lattimore.com/
banditbook/book.pdf.
Li, B., Wang, Y., Singh, A., and Vorobeychik, Y. Data
poisoning attacks on factorization-based collaborative
filtering. In Advances in neural information processing
systems, pp. 1885–1893, 2016.
Li, L., Chu, W., Langford, J., and Schapire, R. E. A
contextual-bandit approach to personalized news article
recommendation. In Proceedings of the 19th interna-
tional conference on World wide web, pp. 661–670. ACM,
2010.
Li, Y., Lou, E. Y., and Shan, L. Stochastic linear opti-
mization with adversarial corruption. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1909.02109, 2019.
Adversarial Attacks on Linear Contextual Bandits
Liu, C., Li, B., Vorobeychik, Y., and Oprea, A. Robust linear
regression against training data poisoning. In Proceedings
of the 10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and
Security, pp. 91–102, 2017.
Liu, F. and Shroff, N. Data poisoning attacks on stochastic
bandits. arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.06494, 2019.
Lykouris, T., Simchowitz, M., Slivkins, A., and Sun, W.
Corruption robust exploration in episodic reinforcement
learning. ArXiv, abs/1911.08689, 2019.
Ma, Y., Jun, K.-S., Li, L., and Zhu, X. Data poisoning
attacks in contextual bandits. In International Conference
on Decision and Game Theory for Security, pp. 186–204.
Springer, 2018.
Mehta, B. and Nejdl, W. Attack resistant collaborative
filtering. In Proceedings of the 31st annual international
ACM SIGIR conference on Research and development in
information retrieval, pp. 75–82, 2008.
Park, H., Jung, J., and Kang, U. A comparative study of ma-
trix factorization and random walk with restart in recom-
mender systems. In 2017 IEEE International Conference
on Big Data (Big Data), pp. 756–765. IEEE, 2017.
Sun, J., Zhang, T., Xie, X., Ma, L., Zheng, Y., Chen, K., and
Liu, Y. Stealthy and efficient adversarial attacks against
deep reinforcement learning. To appear in Proceedings
of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020.
Tuy, H. Dc optimization: theory, methods and algorithms. In
Handbook of global optimization, pp. 149–216. Springer,
1995.
Varah, J. A lower bound for the smallest singular
value of a matrix. Linear Algebra and its Appli-
cations, 11(1):3 – 5, 1975. ISSN 0024-3795. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/0024-3795(75)90112-3. URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/0024379575901123.
Virtanen, P., Gommers, R., Oliphant, T. E., Haberland, M.,
Reddy, T., Cournapeau, D., Burovski, E., Peterson, P.,
Weckesser, W., Bright, J., van der Walt, S. J., Brett, M.,
Wilson, J., Jarrod Millman, K., Mayorov, N., Nelson,
A. R. J., Jones, E., Kern, R., Larson, E., Carey, C., Po-
lat, I˙., Feng, Y., Moore, E. W., Vand erPlas, J., Laxalde,
D., Perktold, J., Cimrman, R., Henriksen, I., Quintero,
E. A., Harris, C. R., Archibald, A. M., Ribeiro, A. H.,
Pedregosa, F., van Mulbregt, P., and Contributors, S. . .
SciPy 1.0–Fundamental Algorithms for Scientific Com-
puting in Python. arXiv e-prints, art. arXiv:1907.10121,
Jul 2019.
Adversarial Attacks on Linear Contextual Bandits
A. Proofs
In this appendix, we present the proofs of different theoretical results presented in the paper.
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition. For any δ ∈ (0, 1/K], when using Contextual ACE algorithm (Alg. 1) with perturbed rewards r˜1, with
probability at least 1−Kδ, algorithm A pulls arm a†, T − o(T ) times and the total cost of attacks is o(T ).
Proof. Let us consider the contextual bandit problem A1, with K arms with contexts x ∈ D such that the optimal arm
has mean reward 〈θa† , x〉 and all K − 1 other arms has mean 0. Then the regret of algorithm A for this bandit problem is
upper-bounded with probability at least 1− δ by a function fA(T ) such that fA(T ) = o(T ). In addition, the reward process
fed to Alg. A by the attacker is a stationary reward process with σ2-subgaussian noise. Therefore, the number of times
algorithm A pulls an arm different from a† is upper-bounded by fA(T )/minx∈D〈x, θa†〉.
In addition, the total cost of the attack is upper-bounded by maxa∈J1,KK maxx∈D〈x, θa〉(T − Na†(T )) where Na†(T )
is the number of times arm a† has been pulled up to time T . Thanks to the previous argument, T − Na†(T ) ≤
fA(T )/minx∈D〈x, θa†〉.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition. Using the attack described in Alg. 2, for any δ ∈ (0, 1/K], with probability at least 1−Kδ, the number of
times LINUCB does not pull arm a† is at most:
∑
j 6=a†
Nj(T ) ≤ 32K2
(
λ
α2
+ σ2d log
(
λd+ TL2α2
dλδ
))3
with Nj(T ) the number of times arm j has been pulled after T steps, ||θa|| ≤ S for all arms a, λ the regularization
parameter of LINUCB and for all x ∈ D, ||x||2 ≤ L. The total cost for the attacker is bounded by:
T∑
t=1
ct ≤ 64K
2
ν
(
λ
α2
+ σ2d log
(
λd+ TL2α2
dλδ
))3
Proof. Let at be the arm pulled by LINUCB at time t. For each arms a, let θ˜a(t) be the result of the linear regression with
the attacked context and θˆa(t, λ/α2) the one with the unattacked context and a regularization of λα2 . At any time step t, we
can write, for all a 6= a†:
θ˜a(t) =
λId + t∑
l=0,al=a
α2xlx
ᵀ
l
−1 t∑
k=0,ak=a
rkαxk =
1
α
 λ
α2
Id +
t∑
k=0,ak=a
xkx
ᵀ
k
−1 t∑
k=0,ak=a
rkxk =
θˆa(t, λ/α
2)
α
We also note that, since the contexts are not modified for arm a†: θ˜a†(t) = θˆa†(t, λ). In addition, for any context x and arm
a 6= a†, the exploration term used by LINUCB becomes:
||x||V˜ −1a,t =
1
α
||x||Vˆ −1a,t (8)
where V˜a,t = λId +
∑t
l=0,al=a
α2xlx
ᵀ
l and Vˆ
−1
a,t = λ/α
2Id +
∑t
k=0,ak=a
xkx
ᵀ
k . For a time t, if presented with context xt
LINUCB pulls arm at 6= a†, we have:
α
(〈
θˆa†(t), xt
〉
+ βa†(t)||xt||V −1
a†,t
)
≤
〈
θˆat(t, λ/α
2), xt
〉
+ βat(t)||xt||Vˆ −1at,t
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As α = 2ν ≥ 2〈θa† ,xt〉 , we deduce that on the event that the confidence sets (Theorem 2 in (Abbasi-Yadkori et al., 2011))
hold for arm a?:
2 ≤
〈
θˆat(t, λ/α
2), xt
〉
+ βat(t)||xt||Vˆ −1at,t ≤ 〈θat , xt〉+ 2βat(t)||xt||Vˆ −1at,t
Thus, 1 ≤ 2− 〈θat , xt〉 ≤ 2βat(t)||xt||Vˆ −1at,t . Therefore,
T∑
t=1
1{at 6=a†} ≤
T∑
t=1
min(2βat(t)||xt||Vˆ −1at,t , 1)1{at 6=a†} ≤
∑
j 6=a†
2βj(T )
√√√√ T∑
t=1
1{at=j}
T∑
t=1,at=j
min(1, ||xt||2Vˆ −1j,t )
But using Lemma 11 from (Abbasi-Yadkori et al., 2011) and the bound on the βj(T ) for all arms j, we have with Jensen
inequality:
T∑
t=1
1{at 6=a†} ≤ 4
√√√√K T∑
t=1
1{at 6=a†}d log
(
1 +
α2TL2
λd
)(√
λ/α2S + σ
√
2 log(1/δ) + d log(1 +
α2TL2
λd
)
)
A.3. Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem. For any ξ > 0, Problem (3) is feasible if and only if:
∃θ ∈ Ct,a† , θ 6∈ Conv
 ⋃
a 6=a†
Ct,a
 (9)
where for every arm a, Ct,a :=
{
θ | ||θ − θˆa(t)||V˜a,t ≤ βa(t)
}
with θˆa(t) the least squares estimate for arm a built by
LINUCB and
V˜a,t = λId +
t∑
l=1,xl 6=x†
1{al=a}xlx
ᵀ
l +
t∑
l=1,xl=x†
1{al=a}x˜lx˜
ᵀ
l
the design matrix of LINUCB at time t for all arms a (where x˜l is the modified context)
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 is decomposed in two parts.
First, let us assume that Equation (9) is satisfied. Then, let θ ∈ Ct,a† \Conv
(⋃
a6=a† Ct,a
)
, then by the theorem of separation
of convex sets applied to Ct,a† and {θ}. There exists a vector v and c1 < c2 such that for all y ∈ Conv
(⋃
a 6=a† Ct,a
)
:
〈y, v〉 ≤ c1 < c2 ≤ 〈θ, v〉 .
Hence, for ξ > 0 we have that for v˜ = ξc2−c1 v that:
〈y, v˜〉+ ξ ≤ 〈θ, v˜〉
Secondly, let us assume that an attack is feasible. Then there exists a vector y such that:
max
θ∈C
t,a†
〈y, θ〉 > c1 := max
a 6=a†
max
θ∈Ct,a
〈y, θ〉
Let us reason by contradiction. We assume that Ct,a† ⊂ Conv
(⋃
a 6=a† Ct,a
)
and consider θ ∈ Ct,a† . There exists n ∈ N?,
λ1, · · · , λn ≥ 0 and θ1, · · · , θn ∈
⋃
a6=a† Ct,a such that θ =
∑n
i=1 λiθi and
∑n
i=1 λi = 1. Thus
〈y, θ〉 =
∑
i
λi 〈y, θi〉 ≤ c1
n∑
i=1
λi = c1 (10)
The problem is feasible, so c1 < maxθ∈C
t,a† 〈y, θ〉. This contradicts Eq. 10.
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A.4. Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition. For an adversarial algorithm A, satisfying a regret RexpT of order o(T ) for any bandit problem and if there
exists an expert m? such that T −∑Tt=1 E(E(t)m?,a?) = o(T ). Then attacking Alg. A with Contextual ACE lead to pull arm
a†, T − o(T ) times in expectation with a total cost of order o(T ) for the attacker.
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Proposition 1, let’s define the bandit with expert advice problem, Ai, such that
at each time t the reward vector is (r˜it,a)a (with i ∈ {1, 2}). The regret of this algorithm is: R˜i,expT =
E
(
maxm∈J1,NK∑Tt=1E(t)m r˜it − r˜it,at) ∈ o(T ). The regret of the learner is: E(maxm∈J1,NK∑Tt=1E(t)m rt − rt,at) where
at are the actions taken by algorithm Ai to minimize R˜i,expT . Then we have:
R˜i,expT ≥ E
 T∑
t=1
K∑
j=1
(E
(t)
m?,j − 1{j 6=a†})r˜it,j +
T∑
t=1
r˜it,a† − r˜it,at

Therefore,
E
(
T∑
t=1
r˜it,a† − r˜it,at
)
≤ R˜i,expT + E
 T∑
t=1
K∑
j=1
(1{j 6=a†} − E(t)m?,j)r˜it,j
 ≤ R˜i,expT + E
(
T∑
t=1
(1− E(t)
m?,a†)r˜
i
t,j
)
≤ R˜i,expT + E
(
T∑
t=1
(1− E(t)
m?,a†)
)
For strategy i = 1, we have:
E
(
T∑
t=1
r˜1t,a† − r˜1t,at
)
=
T∑
t=1
E
(
rt,a†1at 6=a?
) ≥ (T − E(Na?(T ))) min
x∈D
〈x, θa†〉
Then, as R˜1,expT ∈ o(T ) and E
(∑T
t=1(1− E(t)m?,a†)
)
∈ o(T ), we deduce that E(Na?(T )) = T − o(T ). For this strategy
the cost is therefore bounded by:
E
(
T∑
t=1
ct
)
≤ E
(
T∑
t=1
1{at 6=a†} + |ηat,t|+ |η′at,t|
)
≤ (1 + 2σ)E (Na†(T ))
For strategy i = 2, and δ > 0, let us denote by Eδ the event that all confidence intervals hold with probability 1− δ. But on
the event Eδ , for a time t where at 6= a† and such that −1 ≤ Ct,at ≤ 0:
r˜2t,at = rt,at + Ct,at = (1− γ) minθ∈C
t,a†
〈θ, xt〉+ ηat,t + 〈θa, xt〉 − max
θ∈Ct,at
〈θ, xt〉 ≤ (1− γ)〈θa† , xt〉+ ηat,t
when Ct,at > 0 (still on the event Eδ):
r˜2t,at = rt,at ≤ (1− γ)〈θa† , xt〉+ ηat,t
because Ct,at > 0 means that (1− γ)〈θa† , xt〉 ≥ (1− γ) minθ∈Ct,a† 〈θ, xt〉 ≥ maxθ∈Ct,at 〈θ, xt〉 ≥ 〈θa, xt〉. But finally,
when Ct,at ≤ −1, r˜2t,at = rt,at − 1 ≤ ηat,t ≤ (1− γ)〈θa† , xt〉+ ηat,t. But on the complementary event Ecδ , r˜2t,at ≤ rt,at .
Thus, given that the expected reward is assumed to be bounded in (0, 1] (Assumption 1):
E
(
T∑
t=1
r˜2t,a† − r˜2t,at
)
= E
(
T∑
t=1
(rt,a† − r˜2t,at)1{at 6=a†}
)
≥ E
(
T∑
t=1
γmin
x∈D
〈x, θa†〉1{at 6=a†}1{Eδ}
)
− Tδ
Adversarial Attacks on Linear Contextual Bandits
Finally, putting everything together we have:
E
(
T∑
t=1
γmin
x∈D
〈x, θa†〉1{at 6=a†}
)
≤ R˜2,expT + E
(
T∑
t=1
(1− E(t)
m?,a†)
)
+ δT
(
γmin
x∈D
〈x, θa†〉+ 1
)
Hence, because R˜1,expT = o(T ) and E
(∑T
t=1(1− E(t)m?,a†)
)
= o(T ) we have that for δ ≤ 1/T , the expected number of
pulls of arm a† is of order o(T ). In addition, the cost for the attacker is bounded by:
E
(
T∑
t=1
ct
)
= E
(
T∑
t=1
1{at 6=a†}
∣∣max(−1,min(Ct,at , 0))∣∣
)
≤ E
(
T∑
t=1
1{at 6=a†}
)
B. Experiments
B.1. Datasets and preprocessing
We present here the data and how we preprocess them for the numerical experiments of Section 7.
We consider two types of experiments, one on synthetic data with a contextual MAB problems with K = 10 arms such that
for every arm a, θa is drawn from a folded normal distribution in dimension d = 30. We also use a finite number of contexts
(10), each of them is drawn from a folded normal distribution projected on the unit circle multiplied by a uniform radius
variable (i.i.d. across all contexts). Finally, we scale the expected rewards in (0, 1] and the noise is drawn from a centered
Gaussian distribution N (0, 0.01).
The second type of experiments is conducted in the real-world datasets Jester (Goldberg et al., 2001) and MovieLens25M
(Harper & Konstan, 2015). Jester consists of joke ratings on a continuous scale from −10 to 10 for 100 jokes from a total
of 73421 users. We use the features extracted via a low-rank matrix factorization (d = 35) to represent the actions (i.e.,
the jokes). We consider a complete subset of 40 jokes and 19181 users . Each user rates all the 40 jokes. At each time, a
user is randomly selected from the 19181 users and mean rewards are normalized in [0, 1]. The reward noise is N (0, 0.01).
The second dataset we use is MovieLens25M. It contains 25000095 ratings created by 162541 users on 62423 movies. We
perform a low-rank matrix factorization to compute users features and movies features. We keep only movies with at least
1000 ratings, which leave us with 162539 users and 3794 movies. At each time step, we present a random user, and the
reward is the scalar product between the user feature and the recommend movie feature. All rewards are scaled to lie in
[0, 1] and a Gaussian noise N (0, 0.01) is added to the rewards.
B.2. Attacks on Rewards
In this appendix, we present empirical evolution of the total cost and the number of draws of the target arm as a function of
the attack parameter γ for the Contextual ACE attack with perturbed rewards r˜1 on generated data.
Fig. 4 (left) shows that the total cost of attacks seems to be quite invariant w.r.t. γ except when γ → 0 because the difference
between the target arm and the other becomes negligible. This is also depicted by the total number of draws (Fig. 4, Right)
as the number of draws plummets when γ → 0.
B.3. Attacks on all Contexts
Fig. 5 shows the total cost for all the attacks (that is to say including CC LINTS and CC20 LINTS compared to Fig 3).
This figure shows that even though the total cost of attacks is linear for the synthetic and Jester dataset, it seems that for
MovieLens the attacker achieves their goal with a logarithmic total. Therefore, despite the fact that the estimate of θa† can
be polluted by attacked samples, it seems that LINTS can still pick up a† as being optimal for this particular instance.
B.4. Attack on a single context
The attacks are computed by solving the optimization problems 3 and 5 (Sec. 5). We choose the libraries according to their
efficiency for each problem we need to solve. For Problem (5) and Problem (7) we use CVXPY (Agrawal et al., 2018) and
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Figure 4. Total cost of attacks and number of draws of the target arm at T = 106 as a function of γ on synthetic data
Synthetic Jester Movilens
LINUCB 86, 731.6 23, 548.16 25, 017.31
CACE LINUCB 996, 238.6 921, 083.69 944, 721.28
Stationary CACE LINUCB 995, 578.88 862, 095.67 931, 531.6
ε-GREEDY 111, 380.44 21, 911.54 3, 165.81
CACE ε-GREEDY 999, 812.92 999, 755.72 999, 776.82
Stationary CACE ε-GREEDY 999, 806.32 999, 615.98 999, 316.76
LINTS 91, 664.8 23, 398.3 30, 189.84
CACE LINTS 998, 997.04 976, 708.9 990, 250.67
Stationary CACE LINTS 977, 850.96 784, 715.62 845, 512.98
EXP4 93, 860.4 29, 147.01 17, 985.78
CACE EXP4 992, 793.36 989, 214.36 936, 230.4
Stationary CACE EXP4 993, 673.24 988, 463.56 934, 304.23
Table 3. Number of draws of the target arm a† at T = 106, for the synthetic data, γ = 0.22 for the Contextual ACE algorithm and for the
Jester and MovieLens datasets γ = 0.5.
the ECOS solver. For Problem (3) we use the SLSQP method from the Scipy optimize library (Virtanen et al., 2019) to
solve the full LINUCB problem (Equation 3) and QUADPROG to solve the quadratic problem to attack ε-GREEDY.
C. Problem (7) as a Second Order Cone (SOC) Program
Problem (5) and Problem (7) are both SOC programs. We can see the similarities between both problems as follows. Let us
define for every arm a 6= a†, the ellipsoid:
C′t,a :=
{
y ∈ Rd | ||y − θˆa(t)||A−1a (t) ≤ υΦ−1
(
1− δ
K − 1
)}
withAa(t) = V˜ −1a (t)+ V˜
−1
a† (t) with V˜a(t) and V˜a†(t) the design matrix built by LINTS and θˆa(t) the least squares estimate
of θa at time t. Therefore for an arm a, the constraint in Problem (7) can be written for any y ∈ Rd as:
〈
x? + y, θˆa†(t)
〉
− ξ ≥ max
z∈C′t,a
〈z, x? + y〉
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Figure 5. Total cost of the attacks for the attack of Sec. 4 on our synthetic dataset, Jester and MovieLens
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Figure 6. Total cost of the attacks for the attacks one one context on our synthetic dataset, Jester and MovieLens. As expected, the total
cost is linear.
Indeed for any x ∈ Rd,
max
y∈C′t,a
〈y, x〉 =
〈
x, θˆa(t)
〉
+ υΦ−1
(
1− δ
K − 1
)
× max
||A−1/2a (t)u||2≤1
〈u, x〉
=
〈
x, θˆa(t)
〉
+ υΦ−1
(
1− δ
K − 1
)
max
||z||2≤1
〈
z,A1/2a (t)x
〉
=
〈
x, θˆa(t)
〉
+ υΦ−1
(
1− δ
K − 1
)
||A1/2a (t)x||2
Thus, the constraint is feasible if and only if:
θˆa†(t) 6∈ Conv
 ⋃
a 6=a†
C′t,a

D. Contextual Bandit Algorithms
In this appendix, we present the different bandit algorithms studied in this paper. All algorithms we consider except EXP4
uses disjoint models for building estimate of the arm feature vectors (θa)a∈J1,KK. Each algorithm (except EXP4) builds least
squares estimates of the arm features.
E. Semi-Online Attacks
(Liu & Shroff, 2019) studies what they call the offline setting for adversarial attacks on stochastic bandits. They consider a
setting where a bandit algorithm is successively updated with mini-batches of fixed size B. The attacker can tamper with
some of the incoming mini-batches. More precisely, they can modify the context, the reward and even the arm that was
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Algorithm 3 Contextual LINUCB
Input: regularization λ, number of arms K, number of rounds T , bound on context norms: L, bound on norms θa: D
Initialize for every arm a, V¯ −1a (t) =
1
λId, θˆa(t) = 0 and ba(t) = 0
for t = 1, ..., T do
Observe context xt
Compute βa(t) = σ
√
d log
(
1+Na(t)L2/λ
δ
)
with Na(t) the number of pulls of arm a
Pull arm at = argmaxa〈θˆa(t), xt〉+ βa(t)||xt||V¯ −1a (t)
Observe reward rt and update parameters θˆa(t) and V¯ −1a (t) such that:
V¯at(t+ 1) = V¯at(t) + xtx
ᵀ
t , bat(t+ 1) = bat(t) + rtxt, θat(t+ 1) = V¯
−1
at (t+ 1)bat(t+ 1)
end for
Algorithm 4 Linear Thompson Sampling with Gaussian prior
Input: regularization λ, number of arms K, number of rounds T , variance υ
Initialize for every arm a, V¯ −1a (t) = λId and θˆa(t) = 0, ba(t) = 0
for t = 1, ..., T do
Observe context xt
Draw θ˜a ∼ N (θˆa(t), υ2V¯ −1a (t))
Pull arm at = argmaxa∈J1,KK
〈
θ˜a, xt
〉
Observe reward rt and update parameters θˆa(t) and V¯ −1a (t)
V¯at(t+ 1) = V¯at(t) + xtx
ᵀ
t , bat(t+ 1) = bat(t) + rtxt, θat(t+ 1) = V¯
−1
at (t+ 1)bat(t+ 1)
end for
pulled for any entry of the attacked mini-batches. The main difference between this type of attacks and the online attacks we
considered in the main paper is that we do not assume that we can attack from the start of the learning process: the bandit
algorithm may have already converged by the time we attack.
We can still study the cumulative cost for the attacker to change the mini-batch in order to fool a bandit algorithm to pull a
target arm a†. Contrarily to (Liu & Shroff, 2019), we call this setting semi-online. We first study the impact of an attacker
on LINUCB where we show that, by modifying only (K − 1)d entries from the batch B, the attacker can force LINUCB to
pull arm a†, M ′B − o(M ′B) times with M ′ the number of remaining batches updates. The cost of our attack is √MB
with M the total number of batches.
Cost of an attack: If presented with a mini-batch B, with elements (xt, at, rt) composed of the context xt presented at
time t, the action taken at and the reward received rt, the attacker modifies element i, namely (xit, a
i
t, r
i
t) into (x˜
i
t, a˜
i
t, r˜
i
t).
The cost of doing so is cit = ||xit− x˜it||2 +
∣∣r˜it−rit∣∣+1{ait 6=a˜it} and the total cost for mini-batch B is defined as cB = ∑i∈B cit.
Finally, we consider the cumulative cost of the attack over M different mini-batches B1, . . . ,BM ,
∑M
l=1 cBl . The interaction
between the environment, the attacker and the learning algorithm is summarized in Alg. 7.
The attack presented here is based on the AhlbergNilsonVarah bound (Varah, 1975), which gives a control on the sup norm
of a matrix with dominant diagonal elements. More precisely, when presented with a mini-batch B, the attacker needs to
modify the contexts and the rewards. We assume that the attacker knows the number of mini-batch updates M and has
access to a lower-bound on the reward of the target arm, ν as in Assumption 2.
The attacker changes (K − 1)× d rows of the first mini-batch to rewards of 0 with a context δaei for each arm a 6= a† with
(ei) the canonical basis of Rd. Moreover, δa is chosen such that:
δa > max
(√
2MBL2d
ν
+ dMB,
√
4β2maxL
2d
ν2
+ dMB
)
(11)
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Algorithm 5 ε-GREEDY
Input: regularization λ, number of arms K, number of rounds T , exploration parameter (ε)t
Initialize, for all arms a, V¯ −1a (t) = λId and θˆa(t) = 0, εt = 1, ba(t) = 0
for t = 1, ..., T do
Observe context xt
With probability εt, pull at ∼ U (J1,KK), or pull at = argmax〈θa, xt〉
Observe reward rt and update parameters θˆa(t) and V¯ −1a (t)
V¯at(t+ 1) = V¯at(t) + xtx
ᵀ
t , bat(t+ 1) = bat(t) + rtxt, θat(t+ 1) = V¯
−1
at (t+ 1)bat(t+ 1)
end for
Algorithm 6 EXP4
Input: number of arms K, experts: (Em)m∈J1,NK, parameter η
Set Q1 = (1/N)j∈J1,NK
for t = 1, ..., T do
Observe context xt and probability recommendation (E
(t)
m )m∈J1,NK
Pull arm at ∼ Pt where Pt,j =
∑N
k=1Qt,kE
(t)
j,k
Observe reward rt and define for all arms i rˆt,i = 1− 1{at=i}(1− rt)/Pt,i
Define X˜t,k =
∑
aE
(t)
k,arˆt,a
Update Qt+1,j = exp(ηQt,i)/
∑N
j=1 exp(ηQt,j) for all experts i
end for
with βmax = maxMBt=0 βa(t) and M the number of mini-batch updates.
Proposition 4. After the first attack, with probability 1− δ, LINUCB always pulls arm a†,
Proof. After having poisoned the first mini-batch B, the latter can be partitioned into two subsets, Bc (with non-perturbed
rows) and Bnc (with the poisoned rows). The design matrix of arm a 6= a† for every time t after the poisoning is:
Vt,a = λId +
t∑
l=1,al=a
xlx
ᵀ
l + δ
2
a
d∑
i=1
eie
ᵀ
i (12)
For every time t, non diagonal elements of Vt,a = (vi,j)i,j are bounded by:
∀i, ri :=
∑
j 6=i
vi,j ≤
∑
j 6=i
t∑
l=1,al=a
||xlxᵀl ||∞ ≤ dNa(kB) (13)
Whereas for all diagonal elements, vi,i ≥ δ2a > ri. Thus Vt,a is strictly diagonal dominant and by the AhlbergNilsonVarah
bound (Varah, 1975): ∣∣∣∣V −1t,a ∣∣∣∣∞ ≤ 1mini (||vi,i|| − ri) ≤ 1δ2a − dMB (14)
Then, for every arm a 6= a† and any context x ∈ D and any time t after the attack:
〈θˆa,t, x〉+ βa(t)||x||V −1t,a
≤
t∑
l=1,al=a
rt(V
−1
t,a xt)
ᵀx+ βa(t)||x||1
√∣∣∣∣V −1t,a ∣∣∣∣∞
≤ ∣∣∣∣V −1t,a ∣∣∣∣∞ dNt(a) sup
y∈D
||y||22 + βmax
√
d sup
y∈D
||y||2
√∣∣∣∣V −1t,a ∣∣∣∣∞ < ν
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Algorithm 7 Semi-Online Attack Setting.
Input: Bandit alg. A, size of a mini-batch: B
Set t = 0
while True do
A observe context xt
A pulls arm at and observes reward rt
Interaction (xt, at, rt) is saved in mini-batch B
if
∣∣B∣∣ = B then
Attacker modifies mini-batch B into B˜
Update alg. A with poisoned mini-batch B˜
end if
end while
We have shown that for any arm a 6= a† and any time step t after the attack, the upper confidence bound computed by
LINUCB is upper-bounded bu ν the arm a†. Then, with probability 1− δ, the confidence set for arm a† holds and, for all
x ∈ D, arm a† is chosen by LINUCB. The total cost of this attack is d∑a 6=a† δaL = O(√MB)
